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In Federalist #1, Alexander Hamilton identifies two developmental pathways for 
governments. He asserts that governments arise from either “accident and force” or by 
“reflection and choice”. He then goes on to claim that good governments arise from 
“reflection and choice” rather than through “accident and force”. This study is an attempt to 
validate or refute that claim by using a variety of metrics and historical knowledge to run 
regressions to study the relationship between government development and government 
quality. We found that formation type is a statistically significant determinant of 
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PROCESS ANALYSIS 
 Completing this thesis was a challenge that taught me a lot about myself and 
about research. Speaking first to the research experience, I learned how to comb 
through vast quantities of qualitative and quantitative information and data in an 
efficient manner. Completing a literature review over such a variety of political topics 
was very enlightening, and I feel like I understand many aspects of political theory in a 
much more concrete way.  
 Regarding data collection and analysis, I had the opportunity to use many of the 
skills pertaining to statistical analysis that I have learned in my political science and 
economics courses. It was extremely rewarding to have the opportunity to apply my 
learning to a real-world issue. It was simultaneously frustrating and exciting to have to 
trouble-shoot in Excel to get the best possible regressions and visualizations. 
 Writing the thesis came very easily. I put a lot of effort into developing an outline, 
so when it was time to write out my research and findings, I knew exactly what moves I 
needed to make at various points in the paper. I also had a lot of passion for telling the 
story my research revealed, which made the writing process engaging and fun.  
 From a personal perspective, I feel a much deeper appreciation for America. The 
media constantly talks about how terrible circumstances are in the US. Yet, compared to 
the rest of the world, the United States is a wonderful place to call home. I believe that 
my generation has lost sight of this perspective and is quick to want to simply start over. 
America is far from perfect, but it offers its citizens a much higher quality of life than 
other nations offer their citizens. This project opened my eyes to the true extent of the 
challenges facing many countries and has reaffirmed my desire to use my life to help 
other people understand their circumstances and to overcome their challenges.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1980s, the world has been characterized by rapid regime change and 
international intervention. The collapse of the Soviet Union left a vacuum in Eastern 
Europe. The US and international, nongovernment organizations like The World Bank 
tried to instill leaders and institutions in South America to curb socialist expansion and 
create stability. In the Middle East, the United Nations, led by the United States, led 
both military and diplomatic efforts to contain violence, protect oil interests, and 
promote democracy. Perhaps most notably, President Bush declared a “War on Terror” 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks carried out by al Qaeda forces. As part of this effort, 
the US military sought regime change in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran.  
Yet, despite the best intentions of various actors in establishing new governments 
to replace the failed ones, failures continue to occur. Venezuela is in now in crisis, with 
thousands of its citizens seeking asylum throughout the Americas. The Middle East has 
been splintered into factions by US forces, terrorist organizations, and nationalist 
movements. One of the largest humanitarian crises in recent history, the Refugee Crisis, 
has seen millions of Syrian and Yemenis civilians displaced. These numerous examples 
of governments failing has left the world wondering, “What keeps going wrong and how 
can these failures be prevented in the future?” 
The notion of government failure is not a new concept, and these most recent 
failures are not new to the human experience. One of the constants throughout history 
has been the rise and fall of nations.  People have been puzzled for decades by the 
question, “Why do countries have such different outcomes in the quality of their 
government?” While many studies have attempted to answer that question, unexplained 
variation in government outcome still remains. Seeing these grey areas, we began to 
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wonder what other explanations could exist. Then we came across a claim made in 
“Federalist #1” by Alexander Hamilton regarding the relationship between development 
type and outcome. Hamilton writes, 
“It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of 
this county, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether 
societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from 
reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political 
constitutions, on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at 
which we are arrived, may with propriety be regarded as the area in which that decision 
is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act, may, in this view, deserve to 
be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.”  
The claim at the heart of Hamilton’s statement is the inspiration for this study. 
The immediate question this passage leaves its reader with is, “Did Hamilton have the 
right idea?” At least, we were left asking that question. So, we set out to design a study 
that could both evaluate the legitimacy of Hamilton’s claim and contribute to the fields 
of government development and international relations. By looking at whether a 
government developed through “accident and force” (A+F) or “choice and reflection” 
(C+R), we believe that is possible to uncover the relationship between development 
type, a few other key metrics, and the outcome associated with those inputs. This is a 
new approach to the issue of government development. While literature from myriad 
disciplines seeks to explain why some governments are successful and why others fail, 
none have looked at development through Hamilton’s lens. Looking to other studies, 
many disciplines have used their special brand of investigation to look at different 
aspects of government development. Economists have looked at the “resource curse” 
and economic structures; political scientists have investigated colonization, institutions, 
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and political culture; and health researchers have studied disease and the environment 
to explain the variation in government success and quality.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Looking first to economic and political explanations for variation in government 
outcomes, one primary explanation is rooted in the “resource course” phenomenon. 
Many studies have attempted to determine why nations with an abundance of natural 
resources tend to experience more corruption, instability, and generally worse outcomes 
than countries without an abundance of natural resources [1,2,3,4,5,6]. While the notion 
of the “resource curse” is a widely accepted phenomenon, there are plenty of studies that 
either agree conditionally with the theory or reject it outright. Many studies have found 
that other factors related to the management of resources and the political culture of 
resource-wealthy countries are more determinative of outcomes than the simple 
presence of natural resources. In fact, many researchers believe it is the quality of 
government and the extent of its corruption that better predicts the quality of life within 
resource-rich nations than merely possessing limited resources [7,8,9,10]. However, 
despite disagreements, most experts concur that the relationship between government 
and the possession of natural resources impacts the quality of outcomes within a given 
country.  
 Another angle to look at when investigating the differences in outcomes between 
governments is the impact of colonization. Colonization can be broken into different 
components including the identity of the colonizer, institutions, the purpose of the 
colony, and political culture. By looking at the identity of the colonizer, institutional 
metrics and purposes are wrapped-up into one measure. Many of the studies in this area 
have found that colonies under British rule fared much better in the long run than 
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colonies held by France, Belgium, Spain, or Portugal [11,12,13,14,15,16]. These studies, 
which look at the identity of the colonizer as a whole, aggregate the nuanced 
components of colonization to reveal a broader theme. One such concept is that 
different countries choose colonies for different reasons, meaning that colonization is 
not random. For example, Britain sought colonies that would become footholds for the 
British Empire while Belgium sought colonies for resource exploitation. Due to these 
different motivations, colonizers treated their colonies differently and mixed cultures in 
different ways. Additionally, some countries retained authority over their colonies for a 
longer period of time, which is also a single factor believed to have an impact on post-
colonial success of former colonies. 
Another avenue of explanation looks how and why colonies were settled. Starting 
with the “how” component, social scientists have looked at mortality of soldiers to 
observe settlement patterns. The studies attribute post-colonization government success 
to low soldier mortality, because low mortality rates meant that initial settlements were 
more peaceful, had blended cultures, and adopted the institutions and laws of the 
colonizing country [17,18,9,20,21,22].  
Turning to the “why” component, researchers also have found that the purpose 
and identity for the colonized country are thought to explain why the governments of 
some colonized countries turn out so much better than the governments of other 
colonized countries [23,24,25,26]. For example, a country like America, which was 
settled with the intent of starting a new branch of the British Empire, had the 
opportunity to synthesize old institutions with new ideas freely, while colonies like Haiti 
or South Africa were obtained to provide the colonizer with scarce natural resources, 
free labor, and captive markets.  Said as a metaphor, if the two types of colonies were 
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children, the former was a child given the freedom to grow relatively freely while the 
later was a child under strict parental control and limited in behavior. The stunted 
growth of the later is thought to contribute to subsequent government failure post-
colonization.  
Additionally, using the variation in colonizer institutions as an explanatory 
variable has shown that colonies given property rights, voting power, or means for 
recourse tend to have better outcomes than colonies that are denied those institutions 
[27,28,29,30,31]. There is no question that, for countries who are colonized, the factors 
of colonization play an important role in determining the outcome of government in that 
country post-colonization. 
A different vein of explanation regarding regime success or failure stems from 
studies surrounding political culture. Under this understanding, it is thought that 
governments succeed or fail due to the influence of culture within the country in 
question. These studies tend to find that the cultural and traditional norms of a country 
have a significant impact on government outcome [32,33,34,35,36]. While these studies 
tend to be more qualitative in nature, they draw compelling connections between 
culture and regime success. In general, countries with cultures that emphasize 
freedoms, liberties, and fun tend to have better outcomes than those that do not.   
 Turning now to public health explanations for why some governments succeed 
and some do not, the two primary explanatory factors that have been studied are disease 
and the environment. Investigations focused on the impact of disease have identified the 
connection between warm and wet environments with large mosquito populations and 
the high prevalence of diseases like Malaria and West Nile Virus. When laid out on a 
world map, countries fitting the environmental and disease criteria are mostly in Africa, 
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South Asia, and Central America. These are also the locations where countries tend to 
have the most political instability and worst quality of life.  
Another relationship of focus for environmental studies is the connection 
between the environment and economic development. Countries and regions with 
significant geographic barriers that make it difficult for laborers to get to work, goods to 
be transported, or facilities to be built tend to have worse outcomes. Additionally, 
countries with an abundance of very scarce or valuable resources like diamonds, oil, and 
rubber also had worse outcomes because the people with control scarce resources also 
tend to be the people with political power. These individuals then use their concentrated 
power to limit the economic freedom of the citizens of the country in general to 
maintain control. An important piece to note about many of the studies focusing on 
health and environment is that they looked primarily at countries that had undergone 
colonization.  
 While all of these studies have made significant contributions to better 
understanding why variation in government outcomes occurs, a few problems still 
remain. First, many studies focus only on countries that had been colonized by Western 
European powers. This research design means that many countries and governments 
are not included in these studies. The fact that our study does not rely on colonization as 
a means of explaining the variance between country outcomes is one way that it diverges 
from previous investigations. Where many other studies have placed significance on 
whether or not a country was colonized, our investigation cares primarily about the 
transition from an old political model to the most recent version. For this reason, we are 
able to include all countries recognized by the United Nations in our analysis, regardless 
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of former colonization status. This allows us to develop a more complete picture 
government development by including more countries in our sample.  
Another way this study is different its predecessors is that it is not tied to a 
specific time period. While other studies need a lot of historical information regarding 
colonization records, disease patterns, and economic trends to make their analysis 
viable, we are able to develop highly descriptive model using a code for development 
type and then using modern metrics to assess outcome. This not only makes our 
research much easier to update in future years, but it also makes it possible for our 
model to estimate the future relative success of a newly established regime. With the 
metrics used in this study, we can make reasonable predictions regarding a) the 
probability that a regime developed in a certain manner has of being successful, and b) 
how long it takes a regime that developed in a certain way to become good. Despite the 
benefits of a model that can use very current data, this model also has one shortcoming: 
it cannot predict the success of a country spanning the transition from one regime to the 
next. It cannot say that if the current or past government developed in a particular 
manner that the next government will have a given set of outcomes. Our study can only 
provide information about the current regime. 
While the differences between our research and previous research are important, 
the most striking distinction of our study is its universal applicability and its impact on 
modern policy decisions. Having a way to simplify the many ways governments develop 
allows for our theory to be applied to virtually any country’s government and to inform 
policy makers faced sensitive decisions. This feature is what makes our approach so 
relevant. As developed countries and international bodies seek to help or instigate 
regime change around the world, it would be helpful for relevant actors to have a sense 
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of what the consequences of their choices could be without having to take a wait-and-see 
approach. Old governments will continue to fail, and new governments will still be 
developed. This study is a way of using development context to explain why not all 
governments succeed. It is our hypothesis, inspired by Hamilton’s claim, that countries 
that develop through “choice and reflection” will tend to have better governments as 
determined by outcomes within the country than countries that develop via “accident 
and force.” 
METHODS 
This study investigates the governments of all countries recognized by the United 
Nations. We decided on this sample to ensure that we were using an acceptable list of all 
countries in the world and that there would be data available for our analysis. We chose 
to assess such a large sample to control for selection bias and error. The large sample 
size allowed for a representative sample of governments because it captured many 
government types, from all geographic regions, of various ages, and with many cultures. 
Because no two countries have identical internal workings and operations, it is 
important for these differences to be reflected in the data used in our analysis. 
To determine how a government developed, we identified the year the current 
form of government was enacted. To do this, we found the most recent date that a 
constitution or other primary governing code was adopted. We then looked at the 
preceding 25 years of that country’s and region’s history. If a majority of events that 
occurred within that timespan included incidents like war, coup d’etats, unsolicited 
external intervention, or other examples of force, then that government was considered 
to have developed from “accident and force” and coded as a 0. For example, Iraq was 
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coded as a 0 because there was little choice of the Iraqi people to adopt Iraq’s current 
form of government.  
Conversely, if a majority of  events in the preceding 25 years included a 
constitutional convention, an open meeting of a previous government to establish a new 
government, free and public elections, or some other significant example of public 
deliberation, then the government was considered to have developed from “reflection 
and choice” and coded as a 1. As an example, the US was coded as a 1 because the 25 
years preceding the adoption of the Constitution, captured the end of the Revolutionary 
War, the Continental Congresses, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitutional 
Convention. While war occurred, war is not what drove the adoption of the constitution; 
it was the failure of the Articles of Confederation, public demands, and the 
Constitutional Convention.  
To investigate the history of each country, we first looked at the Britannica 
Encyclopedia and the CIA World Factbook. If those sources lacked information, gave 
conflicting accounts, or contained vague reports, we then utilized other sources to find 
the history of selected countries. These sources included archives from the BBC, PBS, 
various government archives and databases, news stories from global and national 
media, and academic publications about specific countries. The reason we focused on 
two sources initially was to standardize how much information was available for each 
country. Because all the countries included in this study are recognized by the United 
Nations, the two chosen sources had very consistent information for us to pull from.  
Another variable we coded for was government type. Government type refers to 
categories like democracy, dictatorship, monarchy, and republic. Each type was 
assigned a numeric value. Appendix Two contains the code for government type. For all 
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countries included in this study, we were very careful to determine formation type prior 
to obtaining any quality metrics. This was done in an effort to keep information bias 
from skewing how countries were coded so that our analysis would reveal true 
relationships, not merely the relationship we hypothesized. 
To determine whether or not a government was good or bad, we used a variety of 
measures about the population and institutions of the country under the assumption 
that a government that is doing well will provide its citizens with a high quality of life 
and positive outcomes. Because the goodness and badness of a government cannot be 
observed, we had to find measures that would be observable products of the goodness 
and badness of government. In identifying these products, we strove to remain as 
objective as possible and to recognize the potential pitfalls of taking this route. Because 
good and bad are subjective, using indicators that are universally acknowledged helped 
to avoid grey area. While we recognize there are imperfections with most metrics and 
the way they are calculated, the metrics we used are standardized so that all countries 
are subject to the same errors. In our analysis, we used metrics that fell into three main 
categories: economic, health, and civil well-being. We focused on these categories 
because a good government establishes the framework within which its citizens conduct 
high-quality lives. Through our research, we found that the quality of life could be 
captured by thinking about three categories mentioned previously. After obtaining the 
metrics within these categories, we generated crude and weighted quality scores for each 
country. These scores allowed us to rank our selected governments from best to worst 
and to identify where the split between good and bad governments lies. This allowed us 
to identify good and bad regimes through an ordinal rank determined by scale and 
ordinal variables rather than by other, more arbitrary, measures.  
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Once the data was compiled, we ran both single variate and multivariate 
regressions. The single variate regressions, coupled with ANOVA, R, and R-squared 
tests, were used to determine which outcomes of good or bad governance are most 
closely correlated with how a given government developed. A few multivariate 
regressions were then used to better evaluate the validity of Hamilton’s claim and to 
retain or reject our hypothesis. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 The first step we took to analyze our results was to look at descriptive statistics to 
better understand our data. Table 1 shows the percent of countries that arose from each 
formation type. 
Number of Reflection and Choice Governments 
64 33%   
Number of Accident and Force Governments 
129 67%   
Total Number of Governments     
193 100%   
Table 1: Number of governments developed from each formation type 
As this table reveals, one-third of the 193 UN recognized governments developed 
from reflection and choice while the remaining two-thirds of those governments 
developed by accident and force. Shown visually, Figure 1 depicts a world map where the 
dark blue represents regime development via reflection and choice and the light blue 





So, You Want to Start a Government 13 
Figure 1: Governments developed by each formation type 
 
 
This breakdown alone prompts several additional questions that query “why is 
that so many more governments develop by accident and force rather than reflection 
and choice?” Some potential answers could be that it takes far more effort to develop a 
regime through reflection and choice. Another answer could be that regimes arising 
from reflection and choice typically follow at least one regime that arose from accident 
and force. As we discovered, more than half of the countries included in this study are 
less than forty-years-old and developed by accident and force, so they may not have had 
a chance to have a regime change via reflection and chocie yet. Figure 2 depicts a 
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Figure 2: Governments grouped by age 
 
 
 As this histogram shows there is a large right-tail skew to government age, 
revealing that there are many young countries and few older countries in the world. 
Interestingly, the United States has the oldest, significantly unchanged constitution in 
the world. While there are several European constitutions and governing documents 
that are technically older, those documents or traditions have all been significantly 
amended to alter the regime type, create new branches of government, or significantly 
shift the distribution of power between existing government entities.  
 Another key descriptor is how many different types of governments were 
represented in our sample. Table 2 contains the breakdown of government type. As the 
table reveals, a vast majority of regimes in existence are republics. Within republics, 
most of those are modeled after the United States’ government or are pseudo-republics 
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Table 2: Number of each type of government 
Moving into the inferential statistics, the investigation gets even more 
interesting. We ran several regressions to try to get a clear picture of the relationship 
between our main independent variable and the various dependent variables. To begin, 
we ran a few crude simple, linear regressions. The results of the crude regressions are 










Formation Type Government Type 0.0356 -0.4078 0.1434 0.0049*** 
Formation Type Economic Freedom -0.005 6.8369 30.6417 0.8237 
Formation Type Freedom Ranking 0.0017 13.0001 11.3013 0.2514 
Year Formed Quality Score -0.003 0.6952 1.0556 0.51 
Formation Type Quality Score w/o GDP -0.0052 -5.0159 73.2425 0.9455 
Formation Type Quality Score w/GDP 0.0965 15935.4116 3435.2837 6.4932E-06*** 
Table 3: Crude, simple, linear regressions 
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As this table reveals, our initial regressions were fairly useless. The adjusted R-
square values show that the independent variables are of little use in explaining any 
percent of the variability of the dependent variables about their means. Additionally, the 
significance of the relationships between formation type/economic freedom, formation 
type/freedom ranking, year formed/quality score, and formation type/quality score w/o 
GDP all lacked statistically significant relationships at a 95% confidence level. The other 
two relationships, formation type/government type and formation type/quality score 
w/GDP, had statistically significant relationships at the 95% confidence level. However, 
they also had large standard errors relative to the data considered in each relationship. 
That acknowledgment coupled with the abysmal adjusted R-square casts a lot of doubt 
on the usefulness of the p-value and the predictive power of the coefficient. 
 However, these were crude regressions that did not consider weights on the 
different metrics. When the metrics were grouped into our three categories which were 
weighted to represent 33% of the overall quality score, the linear regressions ran looked 









Formation Type Weighted Quality Score 0.1211 0.0834 0.0159 4.2311E-07*** 
Government Age Weighted Quality Score 0.2655 0.0018 0.0002 1.0581E-14*** 
Formation Type, 







Table 4: Final regression results 
 These regressions paint a slightly clearer picture than the previous regressions. 
Looking to the first relationship in the table, the adjusted R-Square reveals that knowing 
the independent variables can explain 12%, 27%, and 33% of the variability of the 
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dependent variable respectively. The reason we looked at adjusted R-square rather than 
just the regular R-square is to account for the covariance that exists between the two 
independent variables. The final set of coefficients reveal that a regime arising from 
reflection and choice is associated with a 6.41% increase in weighted quality score. 
Additionally, a one-year increase in government age is associated with a 0.16% increase 
in weighted quality score. All p-values were highly significant at the 95% confidence 
level. Because of this, we can say that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between our independent variables and dependent variable. To further explore the 
relationship we were most interested in, we visualized the dynamics between formation 
type and weighted quality score further in Figures 3 and 4. 
Figure 3: Scatterplot of formation type and weighted quality score 
 


























FORMATION TYPE VS WEIGHTED QUALITY SCORE
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This figure displays the line-of-best-fit for the relationship and includes the 
model equation where b0=0.3789 and b1=0.0834.  
 
Figure 4: Weighted quality score by country 
 
  
This map shows the distribution of weighted quality scores globally. As one might 
expect, North America, Europe, Australia, and parts of South America have the highest 
quality regimes.  
 The final regression ran in this study was a multivariate regression that included 
formation type, country age, six binary variables to identify each continent, and seven 
binary variables to specify government type as the explanatory variables and the 
weighted quality score as the dependent variable. This regression presents an even more 
detailed image of the relationships at the heart of this study. With this regression, the 
© GeoNames, HERE, MSFT, Microsoft, NavInfo, Thinkware Extract, Wikipedia
Powered by Bing
WEIGHTED QUALITY SCORE BY COUNTRY
0.170029924 0.761101478
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adjusted R-square was 0.5140. This means that knowing the independent variables can 
explain 51% of the variability about the mean of the dependent variable. Additionally, 
the significance of the F-statistic was 2.069E-27, which strongly indicates that the 
variation between groups is not random. The results are summarized in Table 5.  
Weighted Quality Score 
  Coefficients Standard Error P-value 
Intercept 0.1710 0.0602 0.0050*** 
Formation Type 0.0396 0.0128 0.0022*** 
Government Age (years) 0.0010 0.0002 0.0000*** 
N. America 0.0000 0.0000  --- 
Europe 0.0676 0.0270  --- 
Asia -0.0352 0.0274 0.2010 
Africa -0.0248 0.0281 0.3782 
S. America 0.0226 0.0304 0.4586 
Oceania 0.0295 0.0320 0.3574 
Democracy 0.2426 0.0600 0.0001*** 
Dictatorship 0.0000 0.0000  --- 
Monarchy 0.2055 0.0569  --- 
Republic 0.1778 0.0552 0.0015*** 
Communist 0.0498 0.0672 0.4597 
Interim 0.0539 0.0948 0.5705 
Authoritarian 0.0588 0.0769 0.4459 
Table 5: Multivariate regression 
  
As this table reveals, the formation type, government age, whether a country is a 
democracy, and whether a government is a republic have statistically significant p-
values. Notably, both the coefficients for formation type and government age decreased 
with the added binary variables for continent and government type. This time, a regime 
arising from accident and force is only associated with a 3.96 percent increase in 
weighted quality score, while each additional year in age is associated with a 0.1% 
increase in weighted quality score. Additionally, only two coefficients were negative. If a 
regime develops in Asia or Africa, then that country’s weighted quality score has an 
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associated decrease of 3.52% and 2.48% respectively. However, these coefficients were 
not statistically significant, so the relationship may not be a reality. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 There are several points of discussion that arise from this study. First, we found 
enough evidence to suggest that Hamilton’s claim in Federalist #1 and our hypothesis 
are validated. Explicitly stated, governments that arise from reflection and choice are 
more likely provide a higher quality of life to its citizens than governments that arise 
from accident and force, according to our correlation model. While we succeeded in 
developing a regression equation that can provide some general predictions for a 
government’s weighted quality score, it lacks enough predictive power to accurately and 
specifically determine the weighted quality score of a country in a useful way. This is 
partially due to the fact that there are likely other confounding variables not accounted 
for in this study. For example, it would be useful to know metrics like previous 
colonization, the identity of the colonizer, geography, disease, political culture, and 
other metrics not identified here. Ideally, the metrics from our study and the metrics 
from studies discussed in our literature review could be combined to develop a very 
specific model. Knowing additional variables could help to further identify what impacts 
the quality of a government. 
 Additionally, the regressions run in this study were all linear. It could be 
interesting to test what would happen under other function conditions and models, such 
including log-linear, log-log, or power models. Future iterations of this study might 
consider using other regression approaches to further test the strength of the discovered 
relationship. 
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 Other statistical technique that could be used to further tease out the minutiae of 
this study would be the use of causal models in addition to correlation models. One of 
the biggest limitations of this study is that nothing we did statistically can support a 
causative statement. Additional tests and robustness checks would be needed for 
causative claims to be made.  
Finally, our study also looked at global standards of good and bad. However, a 
future study could go through and identify the same quality metrics used in this study, 
but for the regime that preceded the current one. With this information, a dif-and-dif 
analysis could be used to put good and bad into terms that are country specific. If might 
be the case that a current government that scores low on the global scale could be a 
significant improvement from the previous government. It would be useful to know the 
change in quality between regimes within the same country. Then, in addition to being 
able to see active change, one could also figure out what pattern of formation type is 
most influential (i.e. going from “A+F to R+C,” “A+F to A+F,” “R+C to A+F,” or “R+C to 
R+C”). 
 Turning to think about the broader implications of this study, it is possible to see 
an immediate application of our findings to foreign policy. It is no secret that the United 
States and several European countries have taken part in regime wars and international 
interventions around the globe. As such, we are seeing, and will continue to see, the 
effect that regime formation via accident and force has on government outcome. When 
political bodies are considering whether or not to intervene in another country’s affairs, 
perhaps our study could be used to help lead key players and policy makers to a 
decision. The findings of our study would suggest that encouraging democratic 
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processes that fit the political culture of the country and refraining from forceful 
intervention could be the most strategic and successful actions to take. 
 Another use for this study would be at a domestic level. As a nation considers a 
change in regime type, perhaps the people within that country should ponder what the 
best method of implementing change is. If they want a regime that is more closely 
correlated with a high quality of life, then this study could be a guide.  
 However, despite the potential utilization of this study to impact government 
decisions, the most important takeaways stem from what our study failed to determine 
and how this investigation complements the findings of other studies. When reviewing 
all the research that has looked at factors of development, a noticeable pattern emerges. 
It would appear that the factors of development people can control (i.e. formation type, 
institutions, etc.), tend to have a weaker impact on the future success of a government 
and country than factors that lie outside human control (i.e. resource possession, 
colonization by another country, culture, etc.).  
One interpretation of this is particularly grim. Looking at this pattern, it could be 
easy to say that the quality and outcomes of government are simply out of humankind’s 
ability to control. Given that humans cannot will resources in and out of existence, nor 
strike memories of past events and cultures from the consciousness of a population, 
these unchangeable and indomitable factors will always have an effect of the state of a 
nation. For the governments in countries that happen to stumble upon the right 
combination of resources, culture, and history, this realization is not all that earth-
shaking or worrisome. However, for governments located in countries that do not have 
the right balance between these uncontrollable factors, this message could be incredibly 
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hopeless. It may seem that, no matter how hard a nation tries to adopt what is believed 
to be good government practices, quality of life within that country will never improve. 
Luckily, there is an alternative and more hopeful interpretation regarding the 
influence of ungovernable forces. Rather than the uncontrollable single-handedly 
determining the trajectory of a government, there may exist a reality where the 
controllable aspects of development can still be used to indirectly steer the other forces 
towards the desired destination. Conditions and outcomes may not be flawless, but 
there can still be improvement. This idea aligns perfectly with observations made by 
Alexis de Tocqueville in his famous Democracy in America. In the final chapter of his 
work, de Tocqueville states,  
“The world which is arising is still half-buried in the ruins of the world falling into 
decay, and in the vast confusion of all human affairs at present, no one can know 
which of the old institutions and former mores will continue to hold up their 
heads and which will in the end go under…The nations of our day cannot prevent 
conditions of equality from spreading in their midst. But it depends upon 
themselves whether equality is to lead to servitude or freedom, knowledge or 
barbarism, prosperity or wretchedness.”  
In this passage, de Tocqueville simultaneously acknowledges that there is much about 
the world that is unknown and uncontrollable. However, he asserts that it is up to 
people and governments to decide how to react to inevitabilities. It is a combination of 
intentional decisions and happenstance that determines regime success or failure. 
 This interpretation is one that provides some hope and comfort. Although 
deliberate actions and choices may not be the most important factor in establishing a 
good government and thus fostering a high quality of life, there are aspects of the 
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development process that can be controlled and used to minimize the bad and the 
wrong. Development studies are incredibly complex, so it seems fitting that no single 
factor can explain, in a simple manner, how to start a government. 
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Appendix 1 – Definitions: 
- Institutions: The formal and informal offices, departments, and rules that govern 
human behavior1  
- Economic Freedom: The fundamental right of every human to control their own 
labor and property2 
- Quality of Life: An individual’s perception of their position in life in the context of 
the culture and value systems in which they live and in relation to their goals, 
expectations, standards and concerns3 
- Government: The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
Exercised, including (1) the process by which governments, are selected, 
monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
them4 
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Appendix 2 – Codebook  
Development Type (Reflection and Choice) 
Development Type Code 
Accident and Force 0 
Reflection and Choice 1 
 
Government Type 



















Number of Political Parties 
Number of Primary Political Parties Code 
None 0 
1 1 
2 2 
≥3 3 
 
